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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
------------
-----------------------
CHESTER E. FARROW, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
HEAL TH SERVICES CORPORATION, 
a corporation, SALT LAKE CLINIC, 
a professional corporation, LOUIS 
J. SCHRICKER, M.D. and LOUIS J. 
MOENCH, M.D. 
Defendants and Respondents.: 
No. 15458 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
The importance of this case and the fact that the law of Utah 
regarding medical malpractice has undergone a significant advance since 
appellant filed his initial brief in this case necessitates a further brief 
and a reply to the material filed by defendants and respondents. 
Swan v Lamb, 584 P2d 814, (Utah 1978) 
On August 16, 1978, this Court decided the case of Swan v 
Lamb, 584 P2d 814, (Utah 1978). Until the d.ecision in the Swan case 
it was virtually impossible to get a medical malpractice case to the jury 
in this state. Local doctors will not testify concerning the work of a 
fellow doctor, except to applaud that work. We see an example of this 
in the two psychiatrists from the University Hospital testifying for Dr. 
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Moench. When docotors are brought in from out of state to render an opin 
ion in a malpractice case, almost without exception, their opinions are not 
admitted because they are unable to say that they are familiar with the 
standard of care practiced in this community. This so-called "locality 
rule" as announced by the Utah cases cited in the Swan case was in-
terpreted and applied by the trial judges of this state with rigid inflix-
ibility. 
The "locality rule" hung over this case like a dark cloud from 
its very inception. It denied to the plaintiff the benefit of the opinions 
of Dr. Sydney Walker, a neuropsychiatrist, practicing in the LaJolla -
San Diego area. Dr. Sydney Walker is well qualified to testify as an 
expert witness in this case. He entered the Boston University Medical 
School in 1960, and graduated in 1964. After that, he spent a year at 
the Presbyterian St. Luke's Hospital in Chicago as surgical intern, a 
year as a President and Teaching Fellow in psychiatry at the University 
of Pittsbury School of Medicine, 18 months residence in Psychiatry at 
UCLA, and two years as a resident in Neurology at the L.A. County 
Hospital. (TR 685-6) He is currently on the staff of five hospitals. 
(TR 688) 
His name was given to the defendants as an expert witness that 
would testify on the part of plaintiff. The defendants thereupon took his 
deposition in California. For the most part, defense counsel solicited 
his opinions relative to the negligence of the hospital, the attending neuro 
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surgeon and the attending psychiatrist. His opinion was that all three 
were culpable. However, the defendants were careful to first estab-
lish that the doctor was not familiar with how things were done in Salt 
Lake City. They knew that if plaintiff attempted to use the deposition 
of Dr. Walker or have him testify in person in court that objections 
to his opinions would be, as indeed they were, sustained. This is 
amply demonstrated by reference to the transcript at page 1939. 
NOTE: 
"Mr. Hanson: Defendant Salt Lake Clinic moves the Court 
to strike all of the testimony of Dr. Sydney Walker upon 
the grounds that the jury may not consider it upon the 
grounds there is no foundation laid for his testimony and 
specifically to show that he is familiar with the standards 
applicable to the field of psychiatry in Salt Lake City in 
this community. I have argued that before, Your Honor, 
so there's no reason to prolong that. 
The Court: The motion is denied. And just for the 
record--and I think I did this--I did sustain the objection 
to his actual opinion each time the question was asked, 
and in denying your motion I am not in any way reversing 
my ruling, my earlier ruling sustaining your objection to 
his opinion." (TR 1939) 
In the brief of Dr. Moench, it is claimed that the locality rule 
is not before the court because the transcript of the testimony of Dr. 
Walker was not included in the designation of record. It was not in-
eluded because the entire deposition was made part of the record. 
Portions of the deposition were read to the jury. However, in each 
instance where the opinion of Dr. Walker was about to be elicited the 
defendants objected and the objections were sustained. This is shown 
by the portion of the transcript quoted above. The portion of the 
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deposition read to the jury was not included in the reporter's transcript 
because it was felt that it would simply overburden the record. If the 
Court feels that that portion of the transcript is necessary, it will be 
reproduced. However, appellant believes that the testimony is properly 
before the Court in the deposition of Dr. Walker and that deposition is 
part of the record. 
The importance of the testimony of Dr. Walker to the case of the 
plaintiff - appellant must not be underestimated. Shortly before the trial 
commenced, the lower court granted summary judgment to Dr. Schricker 
and Health Services Corporation. This error in granting summary judg-
ment would not have occurred had the court given due consideration to 
the opinions of Dr. Walker. 
Under examination by counsel for defendant Health Services Cor-
poration, Dr. Walker stated that the hospital failed to first recognize the 
problem and then to take proper steps to protect the plaintiff. 
"Q. That is generalized statement. I would like you to 
tell me precisely, based on your review of the record, 
what the nursing staff of the LDS Hospital failed to do 
in the treatment of the patient. 
A. I feel they failed to recognize the emotional problem. 
in terms of this man's acute toxic psychosis, number one, 
and then exercise the care of watching him prior to, dur-
ing and after psychiatric evaluation." (TR 765-6) 
Dr. Walker then said, "I stated it as a fact, if he had been 
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properly managed and placed in the psychiatric ward, he would not 
have jumped out of the window." (TR 800) Plaintiff has clearly made 
out of a prima facie case of medical malpractice on the part of the 
hospital. Certainly Health Services Corporation produced contrary 
affidavits (which, of course, were not open to cross examination by 
the plaintiff. ) However, it was up to the jury to determine the weight 
to give the testimony produced by the witnesses, not to the trial judge 
on a motion for summary judgment. The motion for summary judg-
ment was, therefore, improperly granted and the case must be remanded 
for trial. 
As to the negligence of Dr. Schricker, we find that during 
the course of the deposition his counsel elicited the following excerpt 
from an opinion letter written by Dr. Walker. It reads: 
"It would appear that Mr. Farrow's acute psychotic re-
action went unidentified by the hospital personnel or 
attending physicians who, if they had taken appropriate 
measures for diagnosis and correction of the situation, 
would have avoided the patient's catostrophic action." 
(TR 713) 
Dr. Walker further stated that Mr. Farrow's acute psychotic 
reaction "would be a warning that if this proceeds this was going to be 
something that should not be handled on the surgical floor but should 
be handled in a closed ward where there is some more supervision and 
maybe a locked ward, as far as bars in the window." (TR 714) 
Additionally, Dr. Branch in his deposition testified: 
"And I think that the symptoms as they are described 
in there, Dr. Schricker would have been well advised 
to not just ask Mr. Farrow's permission, or whatever, 
.5. 
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to call in a psychiatrist. I think he would have been 
justified in telling him that he needed psychiatric 
consultation and was going to get it. I think his 
relationship with Mr. Farrow would have made this 
quite acceptable." (TR 877) 
Other evidence in the record indicates that the psychiatric 
social worker felt strongly enough about the matter to request a psy-
chiatric consult. Dr. Schricker failed to respond to this question in 
a timely and effective manner. 
In view of the Swan case, plaintiff - appellant who is already 
the victim of medical malpractice should not also be the victim of judicial 
error. 
Some comments are in order on, the brief filed by Dr. Moench and 
the Salt Lake Clinic in order to correct certain legal misstatements. This 
brief raises forensic legal arguments that are inaccurate and do not dispel 
the error committed by the lower court in its instructions or the exclusion 
of the opinions of Dr. Walker. 
The theory advanced by Dr. Moench and the Salt Lake Clinic at 
the time of trial, was that plaintiff was an attempted suicide and therefore 
they were not liable. This theory is embodied in Instruction No. 19. 
This instruction was requested by defendants. No where in the 
brief filed by these defendants is it contended that Instruction No. 19 is 
a correct statement of the law. It is not a correct statement of the law 
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because a psychiatrist has a legal duty to a patient to prevent that 
patient from harming himself is such harm is foreseeable. Defendants 
now admit that this duty exists. (Brief of Dr. Moench and Salt Lake 
Clinic, Page 39.) Instruction No. 19 essentially directed a verdict 
against the plaintiff. In order for the instruction to correctly state 
the law, it should have contained a proviso which would have stated 
in substance that the psychiatrist would be liable, nonetheless, if 
the evidence showed that there was a likelihood that the plaintiff would 
harm himself and that reasonable medical procedures were not under-
taken to prevent such action. 
Although admitting that the instruction is not a correct 
statement of the law, defendants seek to sustain the verdict by stating 
in effect that since the plaintiff denies that his actions were suicidal 
in nature he has no reason to complain about an erroneous instruction. 
Defendants cite numerous Utah cases on the general subject of court 
instructions covering the facts of the particular case. None of those 
cases are in point. Frequently, the legal theories of parties will 
diverge. It is elementary law that the court has a duty to instruct the 
jury on the theories advanced by the parties and consistent with the 
facts of the case. It is also elementary law that when the court in-
structs on the theory of a party it must do so in a legally correct 
manner. Failure to do so is error and a party is not precluded from 
asserting and relying on that error simply because he advances a 
different legal theory. 
. 7. 
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The opinions of Dr. Walker were excluded from consideration 
by the jury. Defendants say that this point cannot be reached by the 
Court because those portions of the deposition read to the jury were 
not transcribed and submitted as a part of the record. In fact, the 
deposition itself is in the record and as pointed out above, a motion to 
strike those portions of the deposition was made to the court and the 
court responded quite clearly to the fact that the opinions were excluded. 
There should be no question in counsel's mind on that point. The fact 
that this material was not put in the record was simply to avoid over-
burdening the record. The deposition is before the Court. 
Defendants next complain that the testimony and opinions of 
Dr. Walker were cumulative. The complete answer to that argument is 
that defendants never objected on that ground. Defendants seem to 
have forgotten that they produced two psychiatrists (Dr. Clark and Dr. 
Bliss) on behalf of Dr. Moench. Defendants go on to say that the opinion 
of Dr. Branch was adequate and that plaintiff did not need the additional 
testimony of Dr. Walker. However, when the testimony and opinions of 
Dr. Walker are compared with those of Dr. Branch, we see that although 
they arrive at the same conclusion, namely, that Dr. Moench was negligent, 
they nonetheless have a different approach to that matter and the plaintiff 
was entitled to have both opinions and the background for both opinions 
go to the jury. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff has not commented on the briefs filed by Health Services 
Corporation or Dr. Schricker because both briefs merely restate the facts 
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relied upon and to support the summary judgment. They do not discuss 
the facts submitted by plaintiff in argument on summary judgment and 
they do not discuss the opinions of Dr. Walker. Suffice to say that 
there are conflicting claims based upon substantial evidence. That, 
together with the fact that the court should have considered the opin-
ions of Dr. Walker under the Swan case, precludes summary judgment. 
Plaintiff has commented extensively on the brief filed by Dr. 
Moench and the Salt Lake Clinic because of the misstatements of law 
therein contained. 
This very complex medical malpractice case must be examined 
and analyzed by this Court in detail. All of the depositions, transcript 
of testimony, and medical records must be examined in depth. When 
that is done. there can be no question but that the action of the trial 
court be reversed and a new trial granted as to all defendants . 
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